How could the War on Terror have been fought better?
For what it’s worth, I think George W Bush’s greatest mistake was that he didn’t strike hard enough, fast enough and go far enough when he could. Obviously this view contradicts the conventional wisdom of Bush’s usual critics. The main piece of evidence for my hypothesis is that the biggest national sponsor of international terrorism, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is still standing (though suffering from significant internal dissention).
Machiavelli taught that when you strike, you must strike as hard as possible. Half a heart digs the grave deeper. Conventional military wisdom concurs when it advises field commanders that it is not possible to apply too much force at the crucial point in a battle.
This strategic principle forms the basis for my own ideas on how the War on Terror should have been conducted. I developed my thoughts within the first several months after 9/11 so I can’t be accused of 20/20 hindsight.
At the time, I envisioned using a much larger force – basically the entire US military – to crush not only Saddam Hussein but to use Iraq as a springboard to take out Iran and Syria, rounding up all terrorists that could be found there, providing as much help as possible to any pro-west elements and then getting out while the getting is good. Prior to coming home, and while there would still be about 10 divisions residing in the Middle East, I would have demanded from all the Middle Eastern regimes that hadn’t been invaded (such as, say, Saudi Arabia) that they turn over all the terrorists who live within their borders or kill them - or you’re next. Such a message, sent out at the very pinnacle of victory would result, I think, in maximum cooperation.
While I would have used much more force than George Bush, I would have counterbalanced this by setting a hard time limit (privately, of course) on the operations: about 2 to 3 years. I would not have engaged in counterinsurgency or nation building (but I would have left a small special forces presence to continue to hunt terrorists). As a result, the shooting war would have been more intense but would have ended much quicker - by the 2004 presidential election, at the latest.
I believe the more intense nature of the fighting would still have resulted in a decisive-battle-style moral victory that the much-longer Iraq insurgency struggle ended up providing. Where I think where my plan is superior is on the domestic front. The weakness of George Bush’s strategy was that, by pulling his punches when he didn’t have to, the hot wars dragged on for far too long. If you look at how America responds to wars - and indeed the history of how democracies in general respond to war - the populace tends to support full-scale wars but not the kind of low intensity conflicts that drag on seemingly forever. The people understand perfectly well the need for an occasional war. What they cannot stomach is perpetual war. This is the reason for the apparent paradox that intense conflicts like World War II enjoy popular support while relatively low intensity affairs like the Boer War, the Philippines’ insurgency and Vietnam become enormously unpopular over time.
P.S. Most of this series has been about Iraq. My take on the Afghan war, and the strategy that should have been employed in that country, has already been explained abundantly and can be found here, here, here and here.