I have argued many times on these pages that the key to victory in the Afghan War is the right strategy. Trying to create a modern nation-state out of a hodgepodge collection of tribes inhabiting a buffer zone created by the British and Russians in the 19th century to separate their empires is a fool’s errand - especially as both empires concluded that this no-man’s land is worthless and ungovernable. However, if the goal of the Afghan War is merely to deny Al Qaeda and the Taliban a safe haven, victory in this war is quite achievable. All you have to do is to employ the existing tribal structure for your purpose: i.e. you tell the tribes that you will leave them alone (and turn a blind eye to their opium trade) if they don’t dabble in international terrorism. But if they do, your fast reaction force in Kandahar will come down on them like a load of bricks. Also, if they play nice, they get some ‘development money’ that nobody will audit. In other words, basically give them thinly disguised bribes. (Psst! Afghan warlords come cheap.)
After observing the Afghanistan war debate steadfastly ignore this option, I read Henry Kissinger’s Washington Post article with great pleasure, as he argues for basically the same thing. Read the whole article, but here are the relevant passages (emphasis added):
“Afghanistan is a nation, not a state in the conventional
sense. The
writ of the Afghan government is likely to run in Kabul and its environs, not
uniformly in the rest of the country. The attainable outcome is likely to be
a confederation of semi-autonomous, regions configured largely on the basis of
ethnicity, dealing with each other by tacit or explicit understandings.
American counterinsurgency strategy -- no matter how creatively applied --
cannot alter this reality.” “All this leaves only a narrow margin for the American
effort. We are needed to bring about the space in which non-jihadist
authorities can be established. But if we go beyond this into designing
these political authorities, we commit ourselves to a process so prolonged and
obtrusive as to risk turning even non-Taliban Afghans against us.” “We have a basic national interest to prevent jihadist Islam
from gaining additional momentum, which it will surely do if it can claim to
have defeated the United States and its allies after overcoming the Soviet
Union.” “Afghan strategy needs to be modified in four ways. The
military effort should be conducted substantially on a provincial basis rather
than in pursuit of a Western-style central government. The time scale for a political
effort exceeds by a wide margin that available for military operations. We need
a regional diplomatic framework for the next stage of Afghan strategy, whatever
the military outcome. Artificial deadlines should be abandoned.” Kissinger
added the following feature to this strategy that I didn’t think of: “Afghanistan becomes an international issue whenever an
outside power seeks to achieve unilateral dominance. Inevitably, this draws in
other parties to establish a countervailing influence, driving events beyond
rational calculation. A regional diplomacy should seek to establish a framework
to insulate Afghanistan from the storms raging around it rather than allow the
country to serve as their epicenter.”