A couple of posts ago I reported on Henry Kissinger’s agreement with my Afghan strategy -
that the key to victory there is to work with the traditional tribal culture,
not against it. Now New York Post columnist Ralph Peters is drinking the same kool aid:
Pick
your tribes: We want to be
friends with everybody. It doesn't work. Our guys are the old Northern Alliance
crowd (who we've treated like dirt in order to woo our enemies). If we want
Afghans to fight on our side, they need Afghan reasons for fighting.
We dream of a
unity government, but the Raj-era Brits figured out that you have to employ
tribes against their rivals. Our goodwill won't overcome ages of hatred. In
poor tribal societies, life is a zero-sum game. To win, you back your
guys.
Exploit
the existing culture: Don't
embark on a costly fool's errand to change the nature of a tribal society. Leverage what you find. Stop
obsessing on what you want long enough to consider what the locals want. If the
desires differ significantly, you must change.
This is absolutely
right. Keep your goals modest, realistic and achievable. And then achieve
them. War is no place for
utopian social engineering. Also, as Peters correctly notes, the conventional
wisdom that nobody every conquered Afghanistan is wrong. The British Empire
did, as Peters acknowledges. (Or rather, it was able to exercise suzerainty over Afghanistan for an extended period of time, which is all that we need to
do.)
Then Peters introduces
a few rules of his own for the conflict:
Recognize
your own limits: It
doesn't help to complain that "counterinsurgency takes a generation"
if political circumstances won't grant you that much time. We should never
expect our armed forces to achieve ideal solutions that exist only in academic
theories.
Except in
existential struggles, such as World War II, we must do cold-blooded
cost-benefit analyses: Are the realistic goals we might achieve worth
the cost in blood and treasure?
To me,
George W Bush’s biggest military failure was acting like his wars had no shelf
life. At the time I reckoned that Bush had a maximum of 3 years after 9/11 for
the ‘hot phase’ of the War on Terror to begin winding down. And there isn’t
light at the end of the tunnel by then, the public will begin to lose patience.
This is why pursuing the WMD case through the UN was so wrong. President Bush
did it to get Tony Blair on side (who, it has to be said, did provide
significant aid). But it cost two years of wasted time. As Napoleon once said,
“I would rather lose a battle than a minute.”
Another
good rule from Peters:
Aid
those already on your side, not your enemies: Our attempts to bribe our enemies with wells, make-work
and welfare are doomed to failure. Reward your allies with aid
projects; let the hostiles envy them -- and figure it out on their own.
Reward good behaviour and punish
bad behaviour. It’s amazing how applicable this principle is and how often we
ignore it.
Here’s a rule
for our negotiators:
Your
enemies must seek negotiations first: Olive branches are worthless against fanatics convinced
they can win. If negotiations are to play a role, it can only be after you've
pounded the insurgents so ferociously that they seek talks. If you
move first, it's read as desperation. Your enemies will act accordingly.
To negotiate
successfully with tribesmen, you must be feared.
The reason peaceniks invariably make such bad negotiators, even though they
profess to love negotiating, is that they do not understand this point. They
imagine a negotiation to be a kumbaya love-in. Bargaining isn’t a love-in and
never have been. There are countless examples from Munich on down to the local
used car dealer to illustrate this point, but never underestimate the power of
wishful thinking to obscure the plain truth.
I am glad Peters is
coming around, and, if his article is to be believed, so is General Petreaus.
Even better. With the right strategy, I believe victory in Afghanistan is
eminently achievable.