Canadian Cincinnatus

Why Jeb Bush makes my skin crawl

The usual reasons given by conservatives for their disapproval of Jeb Bush are his apostasies on illegal aliens, and his support for Common Core. While I also hold these same reservations, that is not what creeps me out about the guy.

For instance, my opinion of his tenure as Governor of Florida is generally positive, and all indications are that he was an able leader of that state. But lately, he has been justifying his pro-illegal alien stance with saccharine-schmaltz like:

“Yes, they broke the law, but it’s not a felony. It’s an act of love. It’s an act of commitment to your family.”

This was the first such pronouncement (which caused everybody’s heads to turn), but since last April, there have been more nausea-inducing statements like this. I guess why I find them so offensive is that he confounds sentimentality with morality. To make an analogy with the art world, it is like confusing Thomas Kinkade with DaVinci’s Last Supper.

This type of moral error is popular among the ditzier elements of the left. For instance, I remember a documentary from the seventies where some bleeding-heart activist-type spoke about the violent crime problem in New York’s ghettos, “all these people need is love.” Riiight. My reaction to Jeb Bush when he speaks this way about illegal immigration: riiight.

(Incidentally, unlike the new-age crowd, the hard-core left has no illusion about how the world works. Read the blood-curdling works of Lenin, Trotsky and Saul Alinsky. They are absolutely hardheaded and realistic about how to get and keep power).

For what it’s worth, Jeb’s brother, George W, is also prone to this kind of fuzzy thinking, particularly in his second term when he allowed it to get the better of him. I think this was one of the reasons that allowed the punitive expedition against Iraq and Afghanistan to morph into an unending missionary war for democracy. Secretary of State Condi Rice was once asked if the she thought the Palestinian people in the Gaza strip wanted democracy. She replied yes, everybody wants democracy.

Earth to the Bush Administration: no, they don’t. A significant segment of the populations in Venezuela, Argentina, the Middle East, Russia and China have no taste nor desire for democracy or freedom. They yearn for a barrel-chested strongman. In Germany in the early 1930’s, a clear majority voted for explicitly anti-freedom, anti-democracy parties: the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, or the communists. Even among North American conservatives, some isolationists seem to admire Putin and other tyrants (cf Pat Buchanan). Are these people wrong? Yes. Are they blockheads? Absolutely. But their opinions, as wrong as they may be, have to be realistically accounted for.

One of the President’s roles is to be the United States’ chief strategist. The worst sin a strategist can make is to refuse to see the world as it really is. For this reason, there is absolutely no place in any President’s world-view for wishful thinking. Sound moral principles yes – schmaltz no. That is why, every time Jeb Bush makes a sanctimonious pronouncement about illegal aliens (while passing over the criminal and welfare-seeking and terrorist elements within that group in silence), he further demonstrates to me his unfitness to hold the high office he is seeking.

 

The War on Terror: what has worked and what hasn’t 10 years on (Part III)

How could the War on Terror have been fought better? 

For what it’s worth, I think George W Bush’s greatest mistake was that he didn’t strike hard enough, fast enough and go far enough when he could. Obviously this view contradicts the conventional wisdom of Bush’s usual critics. The main piece of evidence for my hypothesis is that the biggest national sponsor of international terrorism, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is still standing (though suffering from significant internal dissention).

Machiavelli taught that when you strike, you must strike as hard as possible. Half a heart digs the grave deeper. Conventional military wisdom concurs when it advises field commanders that it is not possible to apply too much force at the crucial point in a battle.

This strategic principle forms the basis for my own ideas on how the War on Terror should have been conducted. I developed my thoughts within the first several months after 9/11 so I can’t be accused of 20/20 hindsight. 

At the time, I envisioned using a much larger force – basically the entire US military – to crush not only Saddam Hussein but to use Iraq as a springboard to take out Iran and Syria, rounding up all terrorists that could be found there, providing as much help as possible to any pro-west elements and then getting out while the getting is good. Prior to coming home, and while there would still be about 10 divisions residing in the Middle East, I would have demanded from all the Middle Eastern regimes that hadn’t been invaded (such as, say, Saudi Arabia) that they turn over all the terrorists who live within their borders or kill them - or you’re next. Such a message, sent out at the very pinnacle of victory would result, I think, in maximum cooperation.

While I would have used much more force than George Bush, I would have counterbalanced this by setting a hard time limit (privately, of course) on the operations: about 2 to 3 years. I would not have engaged in counterinsurgency or nation building (but I would have left a small special forces presence to continue to hunt terrorists). As a result, the shooting war would have been more intense but would have ended much quicker - by the 2004 presidential election, at the latest.

I believe the more intense nature of the fighting would still have resulted in a decisive-battle-style moral victory that the much-longer Iraq insurgency struggle ended up providing. Where I think where my plan is superior is on the domestic front. The weakness of George Bush’s strategy was that, by pulling his punches when he didn’t have to, the hot wars dragged on for far too long. If you look at how America responds to wars - and indeed the history of how democracies in general respond to war - the populace tends to support full-scale wars but not the kind of low intensity conflicts that drag on seemingly forever. The people understand perfectly well the need for an occasional war. What they cannot stomach is perpetual war. This is the reason for the apparent paradox that intense conflicts like World War II enjoy popular support while relatively low intensity affairs like the Boer War, the Philippines’ insurgency and Vietnam become enormously unpopular over time.

P.S. Most of this series has been about Iraq. My take on the Afghan war, and the strategy that should have been employed in that country, has already been explained abundantly and can be found here, here, here and here.

 

The War on Terror: what has worked and what hasn’t 10 years on (part II)

It strikes me that when critics of George W Bush criticize the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they do so with a static view of the world. They assume that a world without the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would look exactly like the world today minus those wars. If this were indeed the case then those wars would truly be unnecessary. But such a view is flawed because it doesn’t account for the effect of Al Qaeda’s losses in manpower and logistics, as well as the negative effect those wars have had on their morale. One of the Bush administration’s bragging points is that there has never been a comparable follow-on strike to 9/11. Pathetic attempts, like the crotch bomber, only underscore Al Qaeda’s decline.

The counterargument sometimes given here is that the cost of the War on Terror (the lives of 4,500 US servicemen, the wounding of 5 times that many, not to mention the casualties incurred by wartime allies like Canada) is greater than the cost in blood of  9/11: 3,000 dead. Cold calculation can lead one to the conclusion that the US would be better off with no War on Terror even if it had meant another 9/11-style attack. President Obama has himself has opined that the US is capable of “absorbing another 9/11.”

He is right, but again, the thinking is too static. After 9/11, the Islamic fundamentalist morale was sky high. If the only response to 9/11 were a few cruise missile strikes on aspirin factories and encampments, the jihadists would have concluded – quite reasonably – that they can get away with anything. Volunteers would have been lining up around the block to do another 9/11. As a result, the danger would not have been another 9/11 but a dozen more 9/11’s. And let us not forget the spectre of a nuclear attack. In 1998, Alexander Lebed – Boris Yeltsin’s former defence minister - testified at the US House Armed Services committee that between 100 and 400 backpack nukes were missing. Where are they? I don’t know, but on September 12, 2001 it would have been reasonable to assume that some of them may be terrorist hands.

Why haven’t any been used? Perhaps because the powers that be in terrorist circles (that would be the nation states that sponsor the terror groups) have made sure that the terrorists they sponsor don’t get their hands on them for fear of an overwhelming American nuclear retaliation. Absent an American demonstration of resolve in Iraq and Afghanistan, would they still fear a Made in the USA Armageddon? Perhaps, but perhaps not.

Above all, it must be kept in mind that war is a dynamic venture, with the relative strengths of the opponents are constantly changing, and that one of the prime movers in this regard is the morale of the participants. One indication of the level of morale among Islamic fundamentalists is their presence, or lack thereof, in the recent Arab spring. For the first time in recent memory, demonstrations occurred in the Arab world that were not dominated by calls to return to theocratic barbarism or wild threats hurled at the Great Satan or Israel. While it may be possible that the Islamists will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the chaos that has followed from the popular uprisings (this is unfortunately likely in Egypt), it is also undoubtedly true that they are no longer on the leading edge. On the Arab street, they are not leading public opinion any longer but following it, and that is a huge change.

For that, I believe, we have the George Bush’s War on Terror to thank.

Part III of this essay tomorrow.

 

Iraqi Shi’ite supporting Iranian Green Revolution?

According to Michael Ledeen, who has been predicting a revolution in Iran for a decade now, says:

The Iranian opposition has enormous internal support, and is also receiving encouragement from Shi’ite leaders in Iraq.  Ayatollah Jamal al-Din, a follower of the Grand Ayatollah Sistani of Najaf (arguably the most esteemed figure in the Shi’ite firmament), called upon the Iranian people to overthrow their leaders and restore freedom to their ancient land.  His words echoed some of Mousavi’s language and bear careful attention: 

Oh, Dear brothers! There is no difference between a dictator who wears a [crown], a dictator who wears a turban and a dictator who wears the traditional Arab gear. Dictators are the same regardless of their styles and languages. Freedom and dignity are the same for every people. And you, the Noble People of Iran, you were the first people in the Middle East to revolt against the dictatorship and corruption in 1979. Today is your day to reclaim your dignity, your freedom and the treasures of your rich country from the grasp of those thieves who stole religion and state. 

If this is true, then there is one man who has to be thanked when Iran eventually does overthrow the mullahs. That man is the much abused former President of the United States, George W Bush. His liberation of Iraq and his pro-democracy initiative, which has been much derided as hopelessly naïve, was a seed planted by him in Iraq that is now bearing fruit elsewhere.

 

What George Bush did wrong (Part VI)

Part I here.  Part II here.  Part III here. Part IV here. Part V here.

Another mistake made by Bush was that the intelligence community was not reformed after 9/11. And not only was it not reformed but it remains completely unreformed to this day. The root cause of the problem was the Church Commission of mid-70’s which recommended rules and restriction that prevented the CIA from effectively running human intelligence gathering operations (“wouldn’t want the CIA to be associating with anybody unsavoury”). Another problem is that there are simply too many agencies doing the same thing. Personally, I believe the money - $25 billion per year – is sufficient. The problem is more of lack of will than a lack of resources.

Mercifully, the stupid ‘intelligence czar’ idea concocted by the idiotic 9/11 Commission was never adopted. The last thing the intelligence establishment needs is another layer of bureaucracy. The problem was that George Bush kept incompetent Clinton appointees in the CIA (George Tenet) and FBI (Louis Freeh) way too long. Both should have been fired right after 9/11.

Instead of preserving the status quo, Bush should have shaken the intelligence establishment to its core. One suggestion: he should have instilled competition between various intelligence agencies by telling them that their future share of the federal budget will depend on their performance in the War on Terror. Simultaneously, he should have freed them up to act more independently and aggressively. And he should have told them that incompetent agencies will be eliminated altogether.

The CIA should have been gutted and rebuilt as a vigorous hands-on agency in the spirit of Wild Bill Donovan. The same should have gone for Foggy Bottom. George Bush should have insisted that the status quo will not be tolerated and that from now on, only results count.

A good example of what the status quo has brought the Bush administration (as well as a demonstration of disloyalty to the War on Terror) was the way the CIA and the State Department subverted Condoleeza Rice’s idea of supporting and fermenting revolt in Iran, through the training of anti-Iranian agents in Iraq as well as the installation of anti-mullah radio stations along the Iranian border. Both programs were quietly subverted into ineffectiveness by hide-bound bureaucrats.

 

UPDATE: 

In the comments section below, Tom M has taken me to task for calling former FBI Director Louis Freeh incompetent. My assessment is based on a series of incidents that occurred at the FBI during his tenure that reflected badly on the Bureau and his leadership.

First there were the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents. These incidents, together, are the two most disgraceful episodes in the entire history of federal law enforcement. While both incidents occurred just prior to his becoming FBI Director, he was involved in the after-action investigation of both. A Justice Department report recommended that Freeh be censured for bungling the Ruby Ridge investigation. In the case of Waco, Janet Reno sent in US Marshals to seize Waco related materials from FBI headquarters. After these incidents, what the Bureau needed was a comprehensive top-to-bottom overhaul of its entire operation. Thanks to Louis Freeh, it did not get this. Instead it got a couple of whitewashed investigations that buried the truth and diffused the blame.

Second, there was the Oklahoma City bombing. It has been claimed by several sources that there was a larger element in the extreme right wing conspiracy that got away because the FBI again bungled the investigation and possibly protected a source.

Third, there was the Chinese penetration of Los Alamos in the mid 1990’s, when they stole many US nuclear secrets, including blueprints for the warhead on the Trident II missile (the most advanced warhead in US possession) and software that models nuclear explosions (very valuable in an era when all nuclear testing is banned). One person, Wen Ho Lee was caught, but he only pled guilty to 1 of 59 charges and was subsequently released after the trial (because he spent 278 days in pre-trial custody). A Justice Dept investigation reported that the FBI bungled the case. To sum it up: the ChiCom’s got away scot-free.

Fourth was escalating terror attacks against the US: the Khobar bombings, the US embassy bombings in Africa and the USS Cole bombings. The first World Trade Center Bombing occurred just prior but was investigated and tried on Freeh’s watch. I think it would be charitable to say that prior to 9/11 (when he was in charge), the FBI was largely ineffectual in its response to this growing threat. For instance, the criminal trial of the World Trade Center bombings resulted in a massive release of critical intelligence information to the public, which greatly aided Al Quaida. The source for this opinion is Andrew C. McCarthy, the DA who prosecuted this case and who now writes about terrorism issues for the National Review. Ask him what he thinks of Louis Freeh.

Fifth, there was the case of illegal Chinese government money finding its way into Bill Clinton’s 1996 reelection campaign. Multiple media sources in early 1997 allege that Freeh may have run political cover for the Clintons when the FBI investigated the matter.

Sixth, I remember an American Spectator article that details a case that occurred when Freeh was an assistant DA in New York City in the 80’s involving the Marciano brothers (the owners of Guess Jeans). According to that article, Freeh had aided the Marciano bros. by getting the IRS to investigate their chief rival, Jordache Jeans.

Seventh was the revelation in the early 2000’s of the FBI crime lab screwing up and possibly falsifying evidence going back many years.

It has often been commented that the requirements of intelligence and counterintelligence work often conflict with civil society. That is, that those policies which aid counterintelligence agencies the most also tend to be the biggest threat to civil liberties, meaning that there will always be a tradeoff between security and liberty. The above incidents suggest that under this standard, Louis Freeh achieved the worst of both worlds: his FBI maximally antagonized the citizenry while remaining impotent to real threats to America’s security.

For similar reasons, Business Week called for Freeh’s resignation in 2000.

In fact, after reviewing these incidents for this update (which I had not thought about for many years), I begin to feel that I have been too harsh in my criticism of George Bush on intelligence issues. I had forgotten what a disaster he inherited.

My information sources on these screw-ups include: three books (Ambush at Ruby Ridge by Alan Bock, The Ashes of Waco, An Investigation by Dick Reavis and No More Wacos: What’s Wrong with Federal Law Enforcement and How to Fix It by David Kopel and Paul Blackman); one award-winning documentary film (Waco: Rules of Engagement); and numerous articles written in the 90’s in the American Spectator, National Review, Reason, Liberty and other publications.

The last paragraph in his comments seems to invoke credentialism, specifically that I am unqualified to criticize Louis Freeh because Freeh is more experienced and credentialed than me in law enforcement and intelligence. The problem with that argument is that it proves too much. For instance, on these pages I have often called Stephane Dion incompetent. Given that Dion has a PhD Sociology, held a tenure track job in his field and has significant experience at the ministerial and party leadership levels, he is more competent than me. This makes me - and almost every professional columnist in the Canadian media - unqualified to criticize Dion. The argument taken to its logical conclusion implies that a person can justifiably criticize only those who are less competent than himself – an absurd proposition.

I do make one correction from my original post: Louis Freeh resigned just prior to 9/11 instead of just after it, as I had mistakenly remembered. This makes my criticism of George W Bush on this point unwarranted.

However, regardless of the precise date of Freeh’s departure, I think it would be apropos to conclude this discussion with one of the best protest slogans of the nineties:

“Freedom isn’t Freeh.”

 

Cincinnatus

What George Bush did wrong (Part V)

Part I here.  Part II here.  Part III here. Part IV here.

War has to be pursued with the intensity it demands, and the War on Terror is no exception. As Napoleon once said, “I would rather lose a battle than a minute.”  There is no doubt that speed is one of the basic principles of war and that the War on Terror was not pursued with sufficient speed or intensity from the outset.

First of all Bush waited far to long to invade Iraq. Once the decision had been reached to invade Iraq it should have been done as soon as practicable. The whole Weapons of Mass Destruction imbroglio with the UN was pursued to appease Tony Blair, who had promised to contribute significant forces, but it cost over a year of precious time. While it would have been necessary to indulge Blair if British forces were really necessary, the fact remains that they weren’t. The US had plenty of soldiers to do the whole thing themselves. While nobody could have predicted that the Coalition would find such little evidence of WMD’s (all the world’s intelligence agencies were in agreement that Saddam had them, and indeed, it was a matter of historical record that he had used chemical weapons on his own people), what could have been easily predicted was that valuable time was unnecessarily wasted. Every day that the invasion of Iraq was delayed was another day when the embers at ground zero had cooled down a few more degrees, and another day that Saddam had to move his apocalyptic goodies to Syria. If you are going to go, go ASAP.

The second critical mistake was that too few troops were used. It is a basic principle of war that, at the critical point, you cannot employ too much force. While situations do arise in war when you have to attempt a mission with whatever means you have available, regardless of whether they are sufficient or not, there is simply no excuse to do so when most of the US Army remained back home. Unfortunately this principle was overshadowed in the 1990’s Pentagon by a fashionable notion called the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) . The idea behind RMA was that smart weapons and other technology had qualitatively changed the nature of war, making the heretofore fundamental principles of war obsolete. In other words, the Pentagon mandarins thought that the US military had achieved such superiority that they could brush any opposition aside by employing only minimum forces (the light footprint). This was a bad idea for Iraq (though it worked in Afghanistan). Unfortunately Donald Rumsfeld liked it. Personally, though I liked Rumsfeld’s crusty personality, he was ultimately not a good SecDef. The bland Gates has been much more effective. The score: basic principle of war 1, Pentagon fad, 0.

To prevent an insurrection, a big footprint is better than a light footprint. Machiavelli recommends that when you sack a city, you must first rule harshly in order to earn the respect of  those you conquer in order to ensure law and order. As you gradually liberalize your rule, you will be viewed as kind and merciful. If you do the opposite and try to be kind and merciful right away, chaos will result. Then, to restore law and order, you will be forced by events to act harshly. As your heavy-handedness increases over time, you will be branded a tyrant. I think it is a fair assessment that until Gen. Petraeus took over, this dynamic was at play. Rumsfeld failed to follow Machiavelli’s advice. This is the third mistake. The US should not have stood back and watched the Iraqis riot and loot their own country when Saddam was overthrown. It was a signal to them that the Americans are soft and set the stage for the insurrection. While watching the looting on CNN, I remember thinking at the time that it was wrong to ignore Machiavelli and that the US will, in any event, have to re-establish order at some point - at a much larger cost. They should have done whatever was required to re-establish order right away (opening fire on the looters if necessary). It was also a big mistake to parole the Iraqi soldiers right away. They should have been interred in POW camps until the country was stabilized and then gradually released after processing. Young men with military training will always form the core of an insurrection.

It is also a fair assessment to say that George Bush dropped the ball from 2005 to 2006 as the situation on the ground deteriorated. A decisive change in strategy was required and all Iraq got was the status quo – until the 2006 mid-term elections shocked Bush into action. This was the fourth mistake. The public’s appetite for irregular war is limited to 3 or 4 years. After that, the public gets antsy to end the damned thing. From Sept 11 onwards, George Bush should have been running against the clock. If Iraq had been invaded directly in 2001 or 2002 with everything the US had and the insurrection forcefully dealt with as soon as it became apparent, it is likely today’s progress would have been achieved by 2005. What a difference that would have made to Bush’s reputation!

Winston Churchill said that it is a mistake to downplay difficulties in any affair frought with uncertainty, such as war. If you do, you tie yourself to purely artificial and unnecessary constraints and deadlines (e.g. “getting the troops home before Christmas”). That is why Churchill’s memorable speeches always stressed hardship and sacrifice and were never specific on how and when victory will be achieved.

What George Bush Did Wrong (Part IV)

Part I here.  Part II here.  Part III here.

Compassionate Conservatism

The idea behind compassionate conservatism (henceforth called ‘CC’) comes from an excellent book,The Art of Political War by David Horowitz. Horowitz is a former 60’s radical turned conservative who, in the dark days of the Clinton years, wanted to teach Republicans how to fight back politically. Illuminatingly, the foreword was written by Karl Rove.

Having read it, I can say that the book had many good ideas, however some were misapplied. One problem was that the Bush administration took some of Horowitz’s proscriptions too literally. One thing Horowitz recommended was that conservatives couch their legislative proposals in the ‘compassionate, touchy-feely’ language of the left so as to politically disarm them. What Horowitz was definitely not proposing was that the left’s policies be adopted and repackaged by the right.

For instance, take the idea of faith based initiatives. This is the policy most associated with CC and actually has some merit to it. The idea is that grass-roots initiatives to alleviate poverty (such as those run by church groups) are much more efficient at helping the poor than large government programs, so why not channel government money through established initiatives that have already been proven to be sound. Politically, it aims to take the issue of poverty away from the Democrats by showing how right-wing principles (self-sufficiency, individual initiative) tackle poverty better. Whether faith based initiatives increase the effectiveness of poverty relief more than they corrupt local churches is an open question (personally, I’d hate to see any federal money flowing to Rev. Jeremiah Wright), but I think it has some merit, if administered carefully.

However, there were many bad CC policies, where right-wing slogans covered purely left wing legislation. These include:

The No Child Left Behind Act, where standardized testing (a right-wing idea) was suppose to take back an issue owned by the left (education). This legislation has many negative left-wing effects. One is the centralization of educational policy at the expense of State and local authorities. Not only is this unconstitutional but it contradicts the principle of federalism (a right-wing principle). Laissez faire dictates that control in an organization should devolve to the lowest level possible to achieve best results. This is why small businesses are more efficient than the politbureau’s five-year plan. Though they wouldn’t state their objections this way, federal interference was definitely not appreciated by local school boards. Many bad consequences resulted. One was that it forced schools to cater to the lowest common denominator, keeping the smart kids back. On reason why Japan and Germany outperform US schools is because they are much less egalitarian. They explicitly weed out poor academic performers into apprenticeship programs and trades. The American approach is to pretend to send everybody to university, which inevitably creates many unskilled dropouts instead. This has always been a central problem with US schools, but it was made worse with the No Child Left Behind Act.

Next, take the prescription drug plan. This is a brand new entitlement that didn’t exist before – and created by a Republican! With all the extra spending created by the War on Terror, there simply was no room for another entitlement. Bush tried to sell it to conservatives on the basis that it was suppose to introduce the principle of medical savings accounts. However, realistically, history teaches us that free market reforms will always be slowly subverted and sidelined by the entrenched bureaucracy, if somebody high up does not keep on top of the bureaucrats. What is worse, for Bush, this was a lose-lose situation. It upset fiscal conservatives while the big government left, who normally loves this kind of stuff, ignored it as if nothing happened.

The most tragic policy was to cooperate with Democrats (and ‘moderate’ Republicans) in continuing the policy of encouraging banks into making ‘affordable’ housing loans. They forced the banks into loaning money without downpayments, giving out mortgages with subprime teaser interest rates, and other destabilizing practices. This clearly triggered the recent market meltdown. It may have even been calculated at the time that this was good politics even though it was bad policy. But in the end bad policy always ends up being bad politics. While it has correctly been pointed out that the fault dates back to the Carter and Clinton administrations, George Bush is nevertheless at least partially at fault for failing to stop the ticking time bomb on his watch. At least partly, he was complicit because affordable home ownership is one of those compassionate conservative ideas.  

What George Bush did wrong (Part III)

Part I here.

Part II here.

Illegal immigration:

The Mexican border is a festering sore and a wide swath of the American public are upset about it and want action. Unfortunately, this is the issue where George Bush’s personal ideology is most out of synch with his conservative base. I believe this issue was the turning point in Bush’s unpopularity. The left’s Bush derangement syndrome was never a factor. That had always been there. What changed was when his base – who had been fiercely loyal to him – turned against him.

The cause of this development was the McCain-Kennedy bill that promised amnesty for illegal aliens before securing the Mexican border with a fence. Up to that point the issue had been simmering beneath the surface. But by championing this bill with all the strength he could muster, George W. Bush brought the issue to the fore, and thereby demonstrated to rank and file conservatives how much they and their President disagree.

The contribution that this issue made to George Bush’s unpopularity is underappreciated because on this issue popular sentiment is at odds with both the left-wing elites and the libertarian policy wonks in Republican circles. The last thing they want to do is to tell the Republicans that the amnesty was a political mistake.

While George Bush has personal reasons for being sympathetic to Mexican immigrants (his brother Jeb married one), he also has a pragmatic reason for his position. He wanted to make the GOP more appealing to Hispanics – the fastest growing ethnic group in America and one that heavily trends Democrat everywhere but Miami.

The problem however is that illegal aliens are underbidding Americans on the job front. Since the jobs illegal aliens take are heavily on the bottom end of the education scale, this doesn’t affect the elites who bithely assume illegal aliens only take jobs that Americans won’t do. However, it has caused severe economic stress on less educated, blue collar Americans (the fabled ‘Reagan Democrats’) who used to do them. The fact of the matter is, is that Americans will do all the jobs that illegal Mexicans do now; it is just that they won’t do them for $2 an hour. While it is an economic fact that an illegal alien plucking chickens for $2 an hour is six times more efficient than an American doing the same for $12 per hour, the process of replacing the latter with the former has the side effect of creating a class of economic losers whose numbers are increasing. Many of these citizens (i.e. voters) simply do not have the smarts to become brain surgeons or hedge-fund managers. They will naturally begin to resent the capitalist system that bankrupted them and become more receptive to the kind of socialistic populism that flourished in the Depression. The end result of this capitalistic process is to undermine the capitalist system politically – a self-defeating effect. This is why there aren’t that many ‘Bush Democrats’.

The only reason the Democrats have not been able to profit more from this issue is that their political correctness forbids them to notice the negative impact of non-whites. However, if the illegal aliens keep flooding in, it will only be a matter of time before a socially conservative, economically populist (i.e. socialist) demagogue comes in and picks up the votes that are there for the taking.

From a strictly economic perspective, the increased efficiency of lower paid workers has a negative economic consequence apart from the political effects that undermine capitalism. The problem is that cheap labour discourages automation. For instance, if fruit pickers were paid $15 an hour instead of $1.50, there is a strong incentive for companies like International Harvester to develop a fruit picking machine that will, in the long run, increase fruit picking efficiency far more than cheap labour ever could. However, at a buck fifty an hour, there is no short-term gain for fruit growers to buy a $1.5 million machine. Economists call the first process, the overcapitalization of labour. An example can be seen in Japan, where industrial automation and strict immigration controls have combined to produce large long-term productivity gains (at least in Japan’s manufacturing sector). Productivity gains are the real basis for wage gains. (Don’t believe the labour unions, no employer will pay you more than you can produce, no matter how hard you bargain.)

At the end of the day one has to ask the question, what’s an economy for? If ordinary Americans don’t benefit from the American economy then why should they care about it? And why should they like the illegal aliens who come to America to take their jobs.

What George W. Bush did wrong - Part II

Profligate spending by the federal government:

Until George W Bush was elected, the Republicans were America’s fiscal conservative party and the Democrats were the tax-and-spenders. While the GOP remains true to its tax cutting roots, the out-of-control deficit spending from 2001 (when the Clinton administration ended with a balanced budget) to 2006 (when the Democrats regained control of Congress and can once again shoulder some of the blame on this issue) means that, at present, the Republicans simply have no credibility with the public on the spending issue. While profligate government spending is fine with the New Deal socialists, the current federal deficit has seriously alienated many members of the small-government, libertarian, leave-us-alone coalition that constitutes an essential element of the Republican base.

What could George Bush have done differently?

In my opinion, his moment of opportunity came on Sept 12, 2001. The 9/11 attacks was a perfect time for George Bush to have rallied the American people on fiscal restraint. This crisis was a window of opportunity when people were patriotic and therefore willing to subordinate their personal interest to the greater good.

In his immediate post-9/11 speech to the joint houses of Congress, President Bush should have clearly stated that the increased military, intelligence and security spending necessitated by the 9/11 atrocity required drastic cuts in the other federal departments in order to maintain a balanced budget. He should have said that the cuts he is proposing will be painful but that the continued economic health of the United States mandates fiscal responsibility. In this way, all manner of wasteful spending, from the useless Department of Education to ethanol subsidies to pork barrel spending, could be eliminated – things that would be impossible to touch in any other political climate. The left’s predictable opposition to these measures would only serve to alienate them with the American public even further. In the days after 9/11, the American people wanted leadership, not special-interest rancour. Of course, seven years later, this window of opportunity has long since been closed.

Instead, America got the No Child Left Behind Act, the pork-laden 2002 Farm Bill, the 2003 prescription drug entitlement, the 2005 pork-laden highway bill and 69,341 earmarks! All this, on top of (necessary) military spending increases, is why the US budget is now a sea of trillion dollar deficits.

 On a related matter, war bonds should have been issued, just like they were in World War I and II. Psychologically, this would have been a smart move. It would have allowed people to buy into the War on Terror personally, making it their war now. By instead telling people to go out and shop, not only was Bush saying something economically ignorant (by ignoring Say's Law), but also on a psychological level he told them that Islamic fundamentalism is no big deal. It’s something that can be left to the experts.

What George Bush did wrong (Part I)

While I definitely think that history will be much kinder to George W Bush than current public opinion polls suggest, the fact of the matter nevertheless is that, at this point in time, he is a deeply unpopular President. This series of articles examines why this is so.

But before I begin to list his faults, I would like to say why I think he will be viewed much better in the future. I think the Presidency his parallels the most is Harry S. Truman’s. Both men had an indifferent record on domestic matters and both were unexpectedly propelled by circumstances beyond their control into prosecuting long, festering - but necessary - wars that were initially popular but which became unpopular as they dragged on. History teaches us that conventional wars (those where the front moves forward when battles are won and backwards when they are lost) rally the populace, in spite of the fact that these are the deadliest types of wars. History also teaches us that unconventional wars where there are no set battles that can be followed by the civilian populace like a ball game may be initially popular, but inevitably become unpopular if they drag on inconclusively. The obvious parallels with Iraq are Vietnam and the Philippines Insurrection.

The conventional ‘wisdom’ - that unconventional wars are unpopular because of the casualties they rack up - is shown to be false by the fact that these wars produce only a small fraction of the casualties of conventional conflicts. Iraq has one of the lowest casualty rates of any war the US has fought (actually the lowest if you don’t count the bloodless Kosovo mission).

Conventional ‘wisdom’ also states that it is impossible for conventional forces to beat a guerrilla force. Again, history teaches us this is false. The US eventually triumphed in the Philippines and set up a pro-American government that lasted until the country was invaded by Japan in World War II (at which point the Fillipinos fought side-by-side with the Americans against the Japanese). Contrary to popular belief, the US also triumphed over the guerrillas in Vietnam. By the time the US military left in 1973, the communist guerrillas had been decisively defeated and a more-or-less stable pro-American government left in charge. Vietnam was defeated in 1975 by a large-scale conventional invasion heavily backed up by military aid from China and the Soviet Union. The US Army did not lose Vietnam, the post-Watergate Congress (led by the Democrats) lost Vietnam by refusing to give militarily supplies to their ally when they were engaged in an existential struggle.

Guerrilla wars are unpopular because they do not affect human psychology the same way conventional wars do.

Conservatives should also remember some of George W Bush’s accomplishments that have been overshadowed by the economy and Iraq, but which are extremely significant. First of all, he nominated two rock-solid constitutionalists to the Supreme Court. The recent Second Amendment ruling would not have been possible without Roberts and Alito. You can be sure their influence on American jurisprudence will continue to be felt long after the recession is over.

The second is missile defence. He brought back missile defence from being a minor pet project in the Pentagon to the technological success story that it is today (judging by the number of successful tests). To do that he had to take a lot of heat by abrogating the ABM treaty with Russia. Given that Russia has over 5,000 nukes, the real possibility that these can be effectively checkmated cannot be underestimated. Given the uncertain course of history, I can easily see a time in the near future where the free world will be breathing a sigh of relief thanks to George W. Bush’s farsightedness on this issue.

So if Iraq isn’t one of Bush’s mistakes (though it is a significant source of his unpopularity), what did he do wrong?

This series examines that question, so stay tuned…